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Abstract
We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially
incompatible network goods in a two-stage game played by an incum-
bent and an entrant ﬁrm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of
a converter. We derive a number of results under diﬀerent assumptions
about the nature of the converter (one-way vs two-way) and the exis-
tence of property rights. In the case of a two-way converter, which can
only be supplied by the incumbent, incompatibility will result in equi-
librium. When both ﬁrms can build a one-way converter and there
are no property rights on the necessary technical speciﬁcations, the
unique equilibrium involves full compatibility. Finally, when each ﬁrm
has property rights on its technical speciﬁcations, full incompatibility
and preemption are again observed at the equilibrium. With incompat-
ibility, entry deterrence occurs for suﬃciently strong network eﬀects.
The welfare analysis shows that the equilibrium compatibility regime is
socially ineﬃcient for most levels of the network eﬀects.
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The two related issues of compatibility and network externalities have, re-
cently, drawn large attention in the economic literature. The existence of
signiﬁcant demand externalities is recognised in a number of markets. The
essential feature of demand externalities is that the individual beneﬁt from,
and consequently individual willingness to pay for, consumption of the good
(service) is increasing in the number of people consuming the same good (ser-
vice) or a compatible one. There are many sources of externalities ranging
from the presence of a physical network connecting consumers, as for telecom-
munications, to the case of a virtual network, as for computers’ software and
other goods for which a community of interest eﬀect arises.
One interesting issue related to the presence of network externalities is
that of the incentives of an exclusive holder of a technology to invite entry of
competitors through licensing. With network externalities, competition brings
two opposite eﬀects: one is the standard competitive eﬀect, which reduces the
monopolist’s proﬁts, the other is the positive demand eﬀect induced by an
increasing network size as output expands. Which of the two prevails depends
on a variety of factors, but crucially on the strength of the network eﬀects.
The literature highlights cases of technologies and proprietary standards
that failed to achieve a critical mass because the technology/standard was
sponsored by a single ﬁrm lacking the power to impose it and it is often sug-
gested that these ﬁrms should have instead invited entry by open license in
the early stages of the market to let the new technology taking oﬀ1.
At the same time, in a signiﬁcant number of industries (software, media,
videogames, hardware, payment systems), largely dominant ﬁrms own pro-
prietary technologies and/or standards that are not licensed to competitors.
Those niche competitors use their own technology which is incompatible with
that of the dominant ﬁrm. Such incompatibility, which aﬀects the size of each
ﬁrm’s relevant network, is not necessarily due to technical reasons, but it is
rather a consequence of the strategic choices made by ﬁrms.
Recent research has shed new light on the incentives to invite entry by a mo-
nopolist oﬀering new explanations for this mixed evidence. Kim (2002) shows,
in contrast with previous literature, that a monopolist holder of a technology
has never the incentive to licence competitors producing an homogeneous good
no matter how strong network eﬀects are. Entry is invited when competitors
1See Economides (1996a). Licensing is a way to avoid lack of credibility by a monopolist;
other reasons for licensing, absent network externalities, are discussed in the literature, see
Shepard (1987), Farrell and Gallini (1988) and Ausubel and Denekere (1987) where it is
shown that inviting rivals can help the monopolist to solve the problem of the well known
Coase’s conjecture.
2produce diﬀerentiated goods and the network externality is weak. The reason
behind this result is that in the case of an homogeneous good, the monopolist
can always replicate the oligopoly outcome costlessly. With product diﬀeren-
tiation this is no longer true since new varieties are costly to introduce. The
model used by Kim (2002) is that of Economides (1996a) and assumes standard
one-period Stackelberg leadership or Cournot competition.
The interpretation we put forward in this paper rests on the strategic role
of the installed base of an incumbent ﬁrm. Network eﬀects induce diﬀerent
incentives towards compatibility on established ﬁrms and entrants. For an
established ﬁrm, the network formed by its installed base of consumers conveys
an advantage on late comer rivals, therefore, it is a valuable asset to defend and
one way of achieving this is by maintaining incompatibility with the entrant.
On the other hand, for late comers compatibility with the incumbent’s network
may be the only way to gain signiﬁcant market share. Examples of this kind of
situation abound. In the videogame industry, Nintendo was dominant in the
32-bit system and denied Atari the permission to include an adapter to play
Nintendo cartridges on Atari’s machines. In the spreadsheet market, Bordland
designed its Quattro Pro spreadsheet so that it could import Lotus ﬁles and
also copied the menu structure used by Lotus, the then dominant player with
its Lotus 1-2-3. In reaction Lotus sued Bordland for copyright infringement.
As illustrated in Shapiro and Varian (1999), one common tactic used by
entrant ﬁrms facing an incompatible incumbent is to add an adapter/converter
or to somehow interconnect with the established technology.
We analyse the conﬂicting incentives that incumbent and entrant ﬁrms face
when deciding whether or not to make their good compatible with the one
produced by the rival by means of a converter, under a variety of assumptions
about the nature of the converter and the existence of property rights.
We build a model in which there is an incumbent ﬁrm which produces
a durable good subject to network externalities. In period 1 the ﬁrm is the
only producer and it faces entry in the second period by a potential entrant
who supplies an homogeneous good which incorporates a diﬀerent technology.
The assumption of homogeneity of the goods allows us to concentrate on the
eﬀects of compatibility choices and of installed bases of users on the pattern
of entry and on the feasibility of entry deterrence. Conceptually, the installed
base of a network good serves the same purpose of irreversible investment in
physical capacity for the incumbent. Whereas, absent switching costs, output
decisions have no commitment value, in the presence of network externalities
and incompatibility, the incumbent can strategically choose the level of ﬁrst
period output in order to reduce the rival’s scale of entry or to preempt it
altogether.
We explore diﬀerent scenarios concerning the way compatibility is achieved.
3In particular we consider the following three cases:
1. Compatibility through two-way converters supplied either by the incum-
bent or the entrant;
2. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant;
3. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant subject to disclosure of each other technical speciﬁca-
tions.
In the ﬁrst case, one of the two ﬁrms may produce, at no cost, a two-
way converter which induces perfect compatibility between the two network
of users. If the converter is supplied by the incumbent then this scenario is
equivalent to the case, widely studied in the literature, of licensing where the
incumbents invites entry. In the second case, each ﬁrm can freely design a
converter which allows its customers to communicate with the customers of
the rival ﬁrm. Finally, in the third scenario, ﬁrms have the possibility to deny
to the rival the technical speciﬁcations needed to build any converter.
Examples of each of the three scenarios can be easily found. A two-way
converter corresponds to the ability, provided by many softwares, to read and
save in the rival’s format. In text processing, for example, Word allows to read
and save in WordPerfect’s format. The unilateral provision of this feature
allows users of both softwares to communicate and therefore the relevant in-
stalled base for each software becomes the entire population of text processing
softwares. Adobe Acrobat allows both reading and saving in postscript for-
mat. In the streaming media industry both Apple’s QuickTime and Microsoft
Windows Media Player can playback and save in each other proprietary format
(.mov and .wav respectively) and in the other common format MPEG (Mov-
ing Picture Experts Group) whose development is supervisioned by the The
Internet Streaming Media Alliance (ISMA), a non-proﬁt corporation formed
to provide a forum for the creation of speciﬁcation(s) that deﬁne an interop-
erable implementation for streaming rich media (video, audio and associated
data) over Internet Protocol (IP) networks. When the two-way converter is
provided by the incumbent, this scenario encompasses as a particular case,
that of licensing with the established ﬁrm inviting entry of a fully compatible
rival.
Examples of one-way converters can take diﬀerent forms. Software may
allow reading but not saving in a diﬀerent format or viceversa. It is interesting
to note the diﬀerence between these two cases. If software A allows reading
but not saving ﬁles produced with software B, then users of the former can
4read ﬁles from the latter but cannot exchange their ﬁles with the users of
software B. In the opposite case things are reversed. As mentioned above,
Bordland Quattro Pro allowed to import ﬁles generated with Lotus 1-2-3 but
not to save ﬁles in Lotus format. In the late 80’s, in the hardware industry
Apple Computers installed the so called “Hyperdrive” diskette drive which was
able to read DOS-formatted diskettes used on Intel-based PCs. Thanks to this
device, Mac users were able to read ﬁles produced on Intel-based computers
but ﬁles placed on Macintosh-formatted diskettes were not readable on DOS
machines.
Recent examples of one-way converters include the so-called viewers intro-
duced by a number of commercial software vendors. These are a downgraded
free version of their main software that allows non-users to view and print ﬁles
prepared with their software. These viewers induce the same result produced
by a converter which allows saving in but not reading a diﬀerent format, the
only diﬀerence being that the transaction cost of conversion rests on the users
of the other software2. An additional advantage of viewers over converters
for software vendors is that they do not have to cope with a variety of diﬀer-
ent formats and to depend on the disclosure of technical speciﬁcations by the
rivals.
The story of Nintendo vs Atari mentioned above better illustrates the third
scenario. Atari tried to achieve one-way compatibility but lacked the intellec-
tual property rights to include an adapter in its machines to play Nintendo
cartridges.
Quite surprisingly, although the literature about entry, compatibility and
standardisation in network industries is well developed,3 it focuses mainly on
the analysis of two-way compatibility, usually introduced via the construction
of a two-way adapter, or the disclosure of technical speciﬁcation by the incum-
bent ﬁrms which invite entry of new competitors through licencing4. In the
seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985), ﬁrms may achieve full (two-way)
compatibility through an adapter which can either be built unilaterally by a
single ﬁrm or be the outcome of a multilateral agreement to deﬁne a common
standard. Incentives to build the adapter are found to depend strongly on
sizes of the ﬁrms’ networks.
De Palma and Leruth (1996), and Economides and Flyer (1997) analyse
compatibility decisions under Cournot competition using the network size as
the only vertical dimension of product diﬀerentiation. Economides and Flyer
(1997) apply the theory of coalition formation to standardization processes
2Examples of such viewers are Word Viewer, PDF Viewer, Excel Viewer.
3See Matutes and Regibeau (1996) and Economides (1996b) for excellent surveys.
4The strategic use of one-way compatibility by providers of network goods is brieﬂy
mentioned in Shy (2001).
5and show that ﬁrms belonging the leading coalition (the dominant technology
with greatest sales) have less incentive to make their standard available to
others as network eﬀects gets stronger. They also show that incompatibility
(i.e. each ﬁrm adopting its own standard) is the equilibrium structure of
the market when externalities are suﬃciently relevant. De Palma and Leruth
(1996) use a duopoly setting to show that the ﬁrms agree on compatibility in a
preliminary stage of the game when there is suﬃcient uncertainty about which
of them would become the dominant ﬁrm. Farrell and Saloner (1992) discuss
the incentive for a dominant ﬁrm to refuse the disclosure of its proprietary
technical information to a rival ﬁrm wishing to build an adapter. The adapter
allows one group of users to beneﬁt the network externalities enjoyed by a
second group and the paper discusses under which circumstances the dominant
ﬁrm is willing to raise the rival’s cost of building the converter.
Baake and Boom (2001) extend this literature by introducing quality as an
additional dimension of vertical diﬀerentiation, network size being the other.
They analyse a four-stage model where two ﬁrms ﬁrst choose the quality of
their products and then they choose whether to install a two-way converter
in order to achieve compatibility. Because of property rights on the technical
speciﬁcations, neither ﬁrm can act unilaterally. Finally, ﬁrms compete on
prices. In equilibrium, ﬁrms choose diﬀerent qualities and full compatibility is
always achieved.
While these analyses perfectly apply to networks such as telecommunica-
tions where compatibility between ﬁrms can only be two-way and where once
interconnection between networks is established then customers can freely com-
municate with each other irrespective of the carrier they belong to, they can-
not represent the rich set of situations that frequently occur in many network
industries; the scope of the paper is to shed new light on the strategic com-
patibility choices of an incumbent ﬁrm which owns a proprietary technology
and which faces potential entry by a rival when the bridge between the two
competing technologies is not restricted to full compatibility but, as suggested
by the wide set of examples provided above, can also take the diﬀerent form
of one-way compatibility.
We derive the following results. The equilibrium in the compatibility game
depends on the type of converter available to the competing ﬁrms to make their
technologies compatible. When compatibility can only be two-way, incompati-
bility is always observed in equilibrium. This scenario is equivalent to the case
of an incumbent ﬁrm deciding whether or not invite entry through licensing;
our results closely resemble that of Kim (2001, 2002), with the incumbent that
never invites entry of a compatible rival. We get the opposite result when
the incumbent and the entrant can freely decide to build a one-way converter.
In this case, full compatibility is the equilibrium. Finally, when each ﬁrm,
6in order to design the one-way adapter, needs access to the rival’s technical
information, then the equilibrium is again full incompatibility. This is exactly
what happened in the videogame industry, where Nintendo did not disclose its
proprietary technical speciﬁcation about its technology, thus preventing Atari
to construct the adapter.
Under the ﬁrst and the third scenario, the incumbent ﬁrm may actually
deter entry if network eﬀects are suﬃciently strong. The incumbent’s installed
base of customers acts as an entry barrier for an incompatible entrant.
This set of results has interesting policy implications that we explore in
the last part of the paper where we develop a welfare analysis. We show that
depending on the compatibility regime taken into account, market forces may
lead to ineﬃciency. Since Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Katz and Shapiro
(1986), the presence of market failures in industries with network externalities
is a well known result. The novelty of the paper is that ineﬃciency also depends
on the type of compatibility (one-way vs two-way). The analysis of welfare
ends with some useful policy considerations.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the basic framework,
section 3 describes the game and the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs; the strategic analysis of
compatibility is given in section 4. The welfare analysis is carried out in section
5.
2 The model
The model has two periods: in the ﬁrst period a single ﬁrm serves the market
and builds an installed base of customers; in the second period entry by a rival
ﬁrm may occur and ﬁrms compete on quantities. We explore three diﬀerent
scenarios concerning the way compatibility is achieved:
1. Compatibility through two-way converters supplied either by the incum-
bent or the entrant;
2. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant;
3. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant subject to disclosure of each other technical speciﬁca-
tions.
The possible outcomes for the three scenarios are 4 in total: i) full com-
patibility between the entrant and the incumbent (two-way compatibility), ii)
full (two-way) incompatibility, iii) the incumbent is one-way compatible with
the entrant and iv) the entrant is one-way compatible with the incumbent.
7With full compatibility, users of the two technologies communicate per-
fectly and the relevant network size is given by the total number of users; if
incumbent and entrant are fully incompatible then each technology has its own
relevant network equal to the number of users adopting it. Finally, with one-
way compatibility the users of the compatible technology can communicate
with the users of the rival technology but not viceversa. Therefore, the rele-
vant network for the compatible technology is the total number of users, while
the relevant network for the incompatible technology is given by the number
of users adopting it.
2.1 Consumers
Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good which is durable. Consumers
base their purchase decisions on expected network sizes. The population of
consumers P is uniformly distributed along the interval [¡1;A], with A > 0,
according to the individual basic willingness to pay r5.
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), the network externalities are captured
by a function V of the expected size of the network that a consumer is de-
ciding to join so that, for given expectations the total willingness to pay for a
consumer of type r0 is given by a r0 + V . We assume that the function V is
monotonically increasing in the expected size of the network; speciﬁcally we
assume that V 0 > 0 e V 00 · 0.
We deﬁne ˆ x1
I as the expected network size of the incumbent in period 1
(i.e. the total number of expected sales in the ﬁrst period). In the second
period, if entry occurs, consumers, prior to their purchasing decision, observe
Firm 1’s realised output in period 1 (i.e. Firm 1’ installed base) and form
expectations about the network size of the two ﬁrms. Expectations on ﬁrms’
network dimension are related to the form of compatibility (two-way vs one-
way compatibility) adopted by each ﬁrm. We denote with ˆ yi the expected
network size of ﬁrm i, i = I;E, in period 2 with:6
ˆ yI = x
1
I + ˆ x
2
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ˆ yE = ˆ x
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i represents the expected number of consumers purchasing the good
from ﬁrm i in period 2.
5The support of r has no ﬁnite lower limit to avoid corner solutions where all consumers
enter the market. The assumption of a uniform distribution yields linear demand functions.
6Henceforth E and I are used to denote the entrant and the incumbent respectively.
8When the incumbent and the rival technologies are fully compatible then
¹ = Á = 1; in this case, users’ expectations about network sizes are equal to the
sum of the two ﬁrms expected sales. When technologies are fully incompatible
(¹ = Á = 0) expectations are formed with respect to each ﬁrm total expected
sales.
One-way compatibility represents the intermediate case, formally when
¹ = 1, Á = 0 or ¹ = 0, Á = 1, in which only one ﬁrm is compatible with the
other and not viceversa: for example if ¹ = 1 and Á = 0, the incumbent ﬁrm,
by means of an adapter or an hardware interface, is compatible with the ri-
val technology while the opposite is not true. In this case, since users of the
incumbent product can freely communicate with rival’s users they form their
expectations on the total amount of output sold while the same is not true
for those who adopt the entrant’s technology. In other words, if the variety
produced by the incumbent is compatible with that produced by the entrant,
ˆ yI contains the installed base of this latter.
2.2 Firms
In period 1 the incumbent is the only active ﬁrm; in period 2 entry by a second
ﬁrm might occur and the two ﬁrms compete ` a la Cournot. The two ﬁrms incur
constant marginal cost (which we normalize to zero) and there is no other ﬁxed
cost. The two goods produced are homogeneous, in the sense that for equal
expected network sizes and prices, the consumers are indiﬀerent between the
two.
We can think of the two goods as performing the same tasks or being
equivalent in all characteristics but incorporating diﬀerent technologies (word
processors, spreadsheets and many other software packages share this prop-
erty). We do not explicitly model why technologies diﬀer; indeed, the focus
of our analysis is not on the introduction of new technologies by new en-
trants, but rather, by assuming exogenously given technological diﬀerences,
we concentrate on the strategic use of converters/emulators/plug-ins to obtain
compatibility.
When ﬁrms set their outputs, they take consumers expectations as given.
This assumption is common in the literature, and implies that ﬁrms cannot af-
fect consumers’ expectations because they cannot credibly commit to a certain
level of output.7
7See Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Economides (1996b) among others.
92.3 Demand
2.3.1 Demand in period 1
In the ﬁrst period, consumers are confronted with a binary decision: buy in
t = 1 or wait until t = 2. They take their ﬁrst period consumption decisions
rationally so as to maximise total expected net surplus over both periods.
Let CS1
I = r + V (ˆ x1
I) be the expected ﬁrst period gross surplus of type
r consumer who buys from the incumbent, and let CS2
i = r + V (ˆ yi) be the
expected gross surplus from belonging to network i = I;E in period 2. A
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i i = I;E (3)
where pt
i is the price of ﬁrm i’s good at time t. The ﬁrst condition ensures
that buying in period 1, the consumer enjoys positive total net surplus over
the two periods; the second ensures that buying in t = 1 is better than buying
in t = 2.
Given the homogeneity of the products, if entry occurs, in duopoly equi-
librium at time t = 2 with both ﬁrms active, the consumer must be indiﬀerent
between buying from the incumbent or the entrant; this implies that:
p
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I ¡ V (ˆ yI) = p
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E ¡ V ( ˆ yE) (4)
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It turns out that, in equilibrium we need to consider the second constraint
only. Which of the two constraints is binding in equilibrium depends on the
sign of p2
I ¡ p1
I=2 ¡ [V (ˆ yI) ¡ V (ˆ x1
I)]=2. If this is negative(positive) then the
second(ﬁrst) constraint is binding. Suppose for the moment that p2
I > p1
I=2 +
[V (ˆ yI) ¡ V (ˆ x1
I)]=2. It is easy to show that second period demand for the
incumbent is zero. This result is accomplished by the incumbent ﬁxing the
price p2
I suﬃciently high. This pricing plan, as is well known from the literature
around the Coase’s Conjecture, is time inconsistent in that chocking second
8Expressions (2), (3) and (4), imply that consumers who bought in period 1 do not switch
to the entrant’s good in period 2.
10period market is ex-post suboptimal for the monopolist. Since he has no way
of committing himself to such course of action, consumers will not believe that
the second period price will be set at a level suﬃciently high. Therefore we
can concentrate on the second condition.
The total number of consumers meeting this condition is x1
I = A ¡ Ã;
therefore the market clearing condition implies that the ﬁrst period demand
function with optimising agents is simply9:
p
1







2.3.2 Demand in period 2
Second period demand is derived as a residual of ﬁrst period demand given
the realised ﬁrst period output. From the necessary condition for two active
ﬁrms in the second period given by (4), let ´ = p2
i ¡ V (ˆ yi) be the common
level of hedonic prices. According to the assumption of uniformly distributed
population and once recalled that x1
I consumers have already purchased the
good in the ﬁrst period, the number of consumers for which r > ´ is equal to
A¡x1
I¡´. Duopoly equilibrium implies the following market clearing condition
A ¡ x
1





which can be rewritten as
A ¡ x
1
I + V (ˆ yI) ¡ p
2
I = A ¡ x
1
I + V ( ˆ yE) ¡ p
2
E = xtot (8)
where xtot is the total output in the second period. It follows that second
period demand functions are:
p
2
I = A ¡ x
1
I + V (ˆ yI) ¡ xtot p
2
E = A ¡ x
1
I + V ( ˆ yE) ¡ xtot (9)
In the following section we derive, by backward induction, the Cournot
equilibrium in the second period and the incumbent’s optimal output level in
9It is worth noting that only the expectations about the ﬁrst period network dimension
enter into the ﬁrst period demand externality function. Although counterintuitive this
has a clear explanation and it does not mean that consumers do not account for ˆ yi when
purchasing the good in the ﬁrst period. Consider (2): the expected net surplus from buying
in t = 1 naturally includes two gross surpluses: CS1
I and CS2
I. Expectations on second
period network size are in CS2
I; when considering the balance between buying today or wait
until the next period, which determines the demand in the ﬁrst period, see (3), CS2
I cancels
out with the analogous surplus obtained if the good is demanded in the second period. In
other words, the additional beneﬁt of the second period network externality on ﬁrst period
consumers valuations is enjoyed also when buying in the second period and it is therefore
irrelevant when the ﬁrst period decision has to be taken.
11the ﬁrst, contingent on the compatibility choices made by the ﬁrms. Given the
assumption of exogenous expectations, there is a continuum of equilibria in
both periods. We restrict the attention to the fulﬁlled expectations equilibria,
namely those where the expected network sizes correspond to the actual ones.
3 The fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we use is that of fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium
(FEE). In each period we restrict our attention to those equilibria which satisfy
the condition that expected network sizes equal the actual ones. Ex-post
consumers expectations’ are correct.
The concept of FEE was ﬁrst introduced in the literature on networks by
Katz and Shapiro (1985) and has been widely adopted by other authors. The
main advantage of FEE is that it restricts the number of possible equilibria
and it may be interpreted as a long run equilibrium concept.
The assumption of FEE is also useful in this two stage game; consumers
form expectations about second period networks, at the beginning of both peri-
ods: therefore we should have both ﬁrst period and second period expectations
about x2
i. By restricting the equilibria to those that match expectations (in
both periods), ﬁrst and second period expectations must be identical at the
equilibrium. For the sake of simplicity, we can therefore make no distinction
between expectations formed at the beginning of the ﬁrst and second stage.
This clearly does not aﬀect the solution of the game but makes the notation
far less cumbersome.
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium cannot be generally granted
and depend on the exact speciﬁcation of the externality function V (¢). In order
to solve the model and to characterise the solutions, we need to specify the
functional form of the externality function. We assume the following:
Assumption 1. The externality function is linear:
V ( ˆ xI) = µˆ xI and V (ˆ y
2
i) = µˆ y
2
i; µ 2 [0; ¯ µ]
The parameter µ measures the strength of network externalities: for given
expectations on network dimension, a higher µ implies a higher willingness
to pay to belong to that network. µ is bounded above; we will show that
this is required to ensure existence, uniqueness and stability of the FEE10.
The admissible upper bound ¯ µ varies according to the kind of compatibility
considered and it ranges between 0:704 and 1.
10Note that with a strictly concave externality function, the existence of FEE is more
easily guaranteed, although additional assumptions are needed to ensure uniqueness.
123.1 FEE Payoﬀs
We are now ready to derive the FEE payoﬀs for the four possible outcomes
of the game: full compatibility (¹ = 1, Á = 1), full incompatibility (¹ = 0,
Á = 0) and partial compatibility (either ¹ = 1, Á = 0 or ¹ = 0, Á = 1).
3.1.1 Second period Cournot equilibrium
Conditional on entry and given consumers expectations, in the second period
ﬁrms compete on output. Firms face the demand function (9); given the
ﬁrst period incumbent’s installed base x1







j = (A ¡ x
1
I + µ ˆ yj ¡ xtot)x
2
j (10)
This is a standard Cournot oligopoly; simple calculations show that incumbent











I + 2µ ˆ yE ¡ µ ˆ yI
3
(11)
These expressions give the quantity produced by each ﬁrm in the second
period as a function of consumers’ expectations about each ﬁrm network size
and given that x1
I customers have already purchased the good in the ﬁrst
period. FEE is derived by setting expected sales equal to the actual ones.
Formally: ˆ yI = x1
I +x2
I +¹x2
E and ˆ yE = x2
E +Á(x2
I +x1
I); solving the system of
equations (11) with fulﬁlled expectations, ﬁrms’ output in the second period






A(µ(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ 1) + (µ(µ(¹Á ¡ 1) ¡ Á ¡ ¹ + 3) ¡ 1)x1
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A(µ(Á ¡ 1) + 1) + (Áµ ¡ 1)x1
I
3 + µ(µ(1 ¡ ¹Á) + ¹ + Á ¡ 4)
(13)
Expressions (12) and (13) give, for the diﬀerent values of the compatibility
parameters ¹ and Á, the output produced by the incumbent and by the entrant
under the diﬀerent compatibility regimes. Existence and uniqueness of the FE
second period Cournot equilibrium are proved in the Appendix.
3.1.2 First period equilibrium
In the ﬁrst period, the incumbent acts as a monopolist and he recognises that
his ﬁrst period output decision has an impact on second period proﬁts. The
















I is the ﬁrst period demand faced by the incumbent as in (7), while
p2
I is the incumbent’s equilibrium price in the second period given in (9) and
x2
I(x1
I) is given in (12). Solving the incumbent’s maximisation problem we
derive the ﬁrst period production given consumers expectations on ﬁrst period














The fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium output in the ﬁrst period is given by:
x1
I =
¡((5¹Á + 1 ¡ 2Á ¡ 4¹)µ2 + (¡4¹ ¡ Á + 9)µ ¡ 10)A
(¡Á + ¹Á ¡ 1 + Á2¹)µ3 + (¡Á2 + Á ¡ 9¹Á ¡ ¹ + 16)µ2 + (9Á ¡ 42 + 8¹)µ + 22
(16)
Uniqueness and stability of the FEE in period 1 is proved in Appendix. The
FEE payoﬀs for the incumbent and the entrant in the four possible outcomes
of the game are12:
¼I
c;c = ¡
A2(8µ3 + 192µ ¡ 176 ¡ 69µ2)
(6µ2 ¡ 25µ + 22)2 ¼E
c;c =
(µ ¡ 4)2A2
(6µ2 ¡ 25µ + 22)2
¼I
c;i = ¡
A2(60µ3 ¡ 176 + 252µ ¡ 11µ4 ¡ 155µ2 ¡ 6µ5)
(22 ¡ µ3 + 15µ2 ¡ 34µ)2 ¼E
c;i =
(¡µ2 + 13µ ¡ 4)2A2
(22 ¡ µ3 + 15µ2 ¡ 34µ)2
¼c
i;c = ¡
A2(104µ3 ¡ 17µ4 + µ5 + 368µ ¡ 176 ¡ 289µ2)




(22 + 16µ2 ¡ 2µ3 ¡ 33µ)2
¼I
i;i = ¡
A2(96µ3 ¡ 176 + 428µ ¡ 2µ5 ¡ 12µ4 ¡ 343µ2)
(22 ¡ µ3 + 16µ2 ¡ 42µ)2 ¼E
i;i =
(¡µ2 + 13µ ¡ 4)2A2
(22 ¡ µ3 + 16µ2 ¡ 42µ)2
where ¼I
c;c ¼E
c;c are respectively the incumbent and the entrant total proﬁts
when both goods are compatible (full compatibility); ¼I
c;i and ¼E
c;i are total
proﬁts when the good produced by the entrant is compatible but not the
opposite (one-way compatibility). Similarly, ¼I
i;c and ¼E
i;c are the proﬁts when
the entrant’s product is compatible but not the incumbent’s, and ﬁnally ¼I
i;i
and ¼E
i;i are the payoﬀs with full incompatibility.
11It is easy to check that the second order condition is satisﬁed.




ﬁrms proﬁt functions. The algebra, available on request, is particularly tedious and for the
sake of brevity it is omitted.
143.1.3 The strategic role of the installed base and entry deterrence
So far we have assumed that in the second period entry occurs. In some
circumstances, this may no longer be the case and entry can be deterred by
the incumbent. The incumbent can use its ﬁrst period output strategically in
order to reduce the scale of entry by the rival in the second period. The output
decision in the ﬁrst period aﬀects second period output for both ﬁrms.
Consider expressions (12) and (13); these give the output of the incumbent
and the entrant at the FE Cournot equilibrium as a function of the incumbent’s
ﬁrst period production and of the compatibility parameters ¹ and Á. Both
these expressions are decreasing in x1
I but this has a stronger impact on the
rival’s output which decreases faster. Consequently there exists a level of ﬁrst
period output, denoted with xd
I, which is suﬃcient to ensure entry deterrence










I, entry is deterred.
However, deterrence is not necessarily proﬁtable for the incumbent because
the entry deterring level of ﬁrst period output may be too high. In the next
proposition we establish necessary and suﬃcient conditions for entry deter-
rence. The proofs of all the mathematical results are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Entry deterrence occurs if and only if:
1. the entrant is incompatible (Á = 0);
2. µ ¸ µd = 0:315.
Furthermore, if µ ¸ 0:394 entry is blockaded; pure monopoly output is suﬃcient
to deter entry.
The idea that the installed base of a network good can play a preemptive
role and possibly deter entry has been recently studied by Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000) in a diﬀerent setting. The basic intuition is simple and closely resembles
that of the traditional case of irreversible investment. Both irreversible invest-
ment and installed base alter irrevocably the conditions under which second
period competition occurs. To better grasp how preemption and deterrence
come about consider Figure 1 where the second period FE reaction functions
are depicted for the case of full incompatibility. These functions should not
be confused with standard reaction functions. The two are very diﬀerent; for
each set of expectations we have diﬀerent reaction functions whereas the FE




















Figure 1: The FE reaction functions
in the standard ﬁrst order conditions. This means that if one ﬁrm plays xj
and consumers expect the other ﬁrm to produce xi, the FE reaction function
of ﬁrm i gives xi
13.
Note that an increase in the installed base of the incumbent shifts both
reaction functions inwards but the eﬀect on the two is asymmetric. A given
increase in x1
I shifts the entrant’s reaction function more than the incumbent’s.
For x1
I = A(1¡µ) the two functions cross at (A¡x1
I;0) and entry is deterred.
As shown in Proposition 1, in the case depicted in Figure 1 the incumbent
chooses to deter entry if µ ¸ 0:315, while, in Bain’s terminology, entry is
blockaded if µ ¸ 0:394 since the monopoly output is suﬃcient to keep the
entrant out of the market.
For later use, we deﬁne the incumbent’s FEE proﬁts in the case entry is







A2µ(µ2 ¡ 3µ + 3) if µ 2 [0:315;0:394]
5
(µ ¡ 3)2 A2
(µ2 ¡ 9µ + 10)2 if µ 2 (0:394; ¯ µ]
(18)
4 The strategic analysis of compatibility
We explore three diﬀerent scenarios concerning the way compatibility is achieved:
1. Compatibility through two-way converters supplied either by the incum-
bent or the entrant;
2. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant;
3. Compatibility through one-way converters supplied by the incumbent
and the entrant subject to disclosure of each other technical speciﬁca-
tions.
Let look at each in detail.
4.1 Compatibility through two-way converter
In this case the bridge between the two, otherwise incompatible, technologies is
provided by means of a two-way converter which allows users of both goods to
communicate perfectly. This amounts to assume that the use of the converter
does not downgrade the performance15. The unilateral provision of a two-way
converter is the case most often considered in the literature since Katz and
Shapiro (1985).
Assume that the decision to build a converter is up to the incumbent ﬁrm in
stage 1 and that the ﬁrm incurs no cost in the production of the converter16.
Also, we assume that the incumbent can credibly commit to such course of
action either by making the converter available right at the beginning of t = 1
or by including such a clause in the contract signed with its customers.
14To compute this proﬁt function, we use the outputs produced by the incumbent in the
two periods when deterring entry are xd
I = A(1 ¡ µ) and x2




15Allowing for performance disruption is an easy task from which we abstain to avoid
cumbersome notation.
16The assumption of zero costs for the converter is broadly consistent with the observation
that converters are often a simple add-on to much more complex software whose development
costs are much more relevant.
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Figure 2: The time line with two-way converter
Compatibility implies that the size of the relevant network for customers of
both goods is the same and equal to total amount of output sold. Consumers in
period 1 contemplating the purchase of the good incorporate this information
in their expectations. Formally, this is equivalent to saying that we have only
one compatibility parameter, or ¹ = Á; therefore consumers expectations are:
ˆ yI = ˆ x
2





ˆ yE = ˆ x
2





where ¹ = 0 implies that no converter is built, and ¹ = 1 otherwise.17 The time
line is represented in Figure 2. With compatibility the incumbent accrues to
the value of its network in both periods through consumers expectations but, at
the same time, increases rival’s competitiveness because, with compatibility,
the incumbent shares the ﬁrst period installed base with the entrant, thus
making its product perfectly homogeneous, in terms of network size, with the
rival’s. Furthermore, compatibility makes entry deterrence unfeasible due to
the sharing of the installed base.
Proposition 2. The incumbent always chooses incompatibility (¹ = 0); for
µ ¸ µd entry is deterred.
The advantage from increasing the size of the incumbent network through
compatibility is small, and the strategic eﬀect of a dominant position in the
market prevails.
Consumers maximise their expected surplus across the two periods; high
expected prices in period 2 increase demand in period 1, when the incumbent
is a monopolist. Incompatibility, then has the additional beneﬁt of allowing
17Compatibility levels however may take intermediate values between 0 and 1. We do not
consider this possibility. This does not result in a severe loss because, given the assumption
that the cost of compatibility, through converters, is zero, one can easily show that the
entrant will always choose full compatibility, and that the incumbent will prefer extreme to
intermediate values.
18the incumbent to charge in period 2 a price which is higher than that charged
by the rival and this increases ﬁrst periods sales. Incompatibility is chosen
whatever µ and deterrence occurs for µ ¸ µd.
This conﬁrms in a two stage setting the result of the recent literature
on monopolist’s incentive to invite entry of a compatible rival: as in Kim
(2001) and Kim (2002), in our model the incumbent monopolist has never
the incentive to invite entry of an homogeneous and compatible technology,
regardless the degree of network eﬀects.
The case where the entrant builds the two-way converter is trivial. Pro-
vision of the converter is a dominant strategy for the entrant because with




4.2 Compatibility through one-way converters
Under this scenario each ﬁrm has the ability to build a one-way converter,
which allows one-way compatibility to the users of its product. As an example
think of a software package that can read ﬁles created by other packages but
cannot save in their format. More generally, one-way compatibility happens
when a component from one system works in the other, but the reverse is not
true (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). One-way converters allow one of the technolo-
gies to obtain the network externalities accruing from the installed base of the
other but not viceversa (David and Buun, 1988).
Again, the incumbent chooses ¹ at the beginning of the game and can
credibly commit to this decision. The rival chooses whether to build or not
to build the converter at time t = 2 having observed the incumbent’s choices.
The relevant expected networks are:
ˆ yI = ˆ x
2





ˆ yE = ˆ x
2





where Á = 0 (¹ = 0) implies that the entrant (incumbent) builds no converter,
and Á = 1 (¹ = 1) otherwise. The timeline is represented in Figure 3. It
should be noted that we have implicitly assumed that one-way compatibility
allows the ﬁrm providing it to reap the full beneﬁts of enlarged network size.
This amounts to assume that the network externality enjoyed by consumers of
the one-way compatible good are independent of the provision of the converter
by the ﬁrm producing the other good.
The game tree is represented in Figure 4. The incumbent’s decision to build
a converter is taken before production in the ﬁrst period takes place, at the
beginning of the second period; the entrant, having observed the incumbent’s
19- t=0 t=1 t=2
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Figure 4: The game tree with one-way converters
choice, decides whether to build a converter itself. In FE equilibrium the
decision by the entrant is correctly anticipated by consumers in period 1.
Proposition 3. For any possible value of µ, the only subgame perfect FE
equilibrium involves both players building a converter (full compatibility: ¹ = 1,
Á = 1).
This result is driven by the behavior of the entrant whose dominant strat-
egy is to build the converter. By doing so, the entrant enlarges its relevant
network with the installed base of the incumbent, which in turn prefers to
to be compatible itself with a one-way compatible rival. Under this scenario,
entry cannot be prevented by the incumbent and the entrant is on an equal
















Figure 5: The time line with one-way converters and information disclosure
Corollary 1. Entry of a one-way compatible entrant cannot be discouraged.
4.3 Compatibility through one-way converters and dis-
closure of technical speciﬁcations
In this last case, the two ﬁrms have property rights on the technical speciﬁ-
cations that are needed to build a one-way converter. Alternatively we can
think of the case in which in order to build a converter access is required to
information that is privately owned by ﬁrms.
This implies that each ﬁrm has to decide whether or not to disclose such
information to the rival, which in turn has to decide what to do with this
information. Using the same notation, this time the incumbent ﬁrm chooses
Á = 1 if he discloses the information, or Á = 0 otherwise. Similarly, the entrant
chooses ¹. Once oﬀered the information each ﬁrm decides about the building
of the converter; we call this decision accept or reject. The eﬀect on the size of
the relevant expected networks is the same described in the previous section.
The time line is represented in Figure 5.
The incumbent ﬁrm makes a commitment at the beginning of period 1
about disclosure of the technical info required for the building of the converter
by the entrant. The same decision is taken by the entrant at the beginning of
period 2 when the two ﬁrms decide, if given the opportunity by the rival, to
build the converter before competing in quantities. The game tree is given in
Figure 6.
Proposition 4. The FE subgame perfect equilibrium involves:
1. full incompatibility if µ < µd;



















































Figure 6: The game tree with one-way converters and information disclosure
22This result is interesting: both ﬁrms strictly prefer not to disclose their
private information to the rival. By doing so, with strong network externalities
(µ ¸ µd), the incumbent is also able to deter entry.
The existence of property rights on private information, alters the equilib-
rium dramatically compared with the scenario analysed in the previous section.
The entrant likes compatibility with the incumbent but information disclosure
is a dominated action. Moreover, provision of a one-way adapter by the entrant
is possible only if the incumbent discloses its own private information and it
is never optimal for it to do so. Even allowing the entrant the possibility of a
credible commitment about the revelation of its information, the equilibrium
outcome does not change since for the incumbent it is still dominant not to
disclose.
This result closely replicates what has been observed in the videogame
industry when Nintendo denied Atari the permission to include an adapter
to allow Atari’s users to play games written for Nintendo. In this case, the
existence of property rights has allowed an established technology to maintain
its dominant position preventing rivals to interconnect with its installed base.
5 Welfare analysis and policy implications
We conclude the paper by studying the choice of compatibility from the point
of view of a welfare maximising regulator or authority; we do so by contrast-
ing the above compatibility choices obtained as equilibrium of the diﬀerent
games, with the compatibility regime that would be selected by a social wel-
fare optimising agent, provided that ﬁrms are free to compete in quantities.
The comparison between the solutions of the diﬀerent games with the socially
optimal compatibility regime will provide some useful policy implications.
Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumer’s and producer’s surplus
in the two periods. Social welfare depends on the compatibility parameters Á







i(Á;¹;µ) i = I;E (19)
where CSi denotes the surplus enjoyed by period i consumers.
Consider ﬁrst period consumers. The total surplus that each ﬁrst period
consumer enjoys is the sum of the surplus derived over both periods. According
to expression (2), the total surplus for the individual of type r is
CS




I + r + V (ˆ yI) (20)
23where p1
I is the price paid in the ﬁrst period which, according to (7), depends
on the price in the second period, p2
I. Replacing (7) and (9) into (20) and
rearranging we ﬁnally derive the total surplus for type r individual when he
joins the incumbent network in the ﬁrst period:
CS







At the fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium, only those consumers with r big-
ger than A ¡ xI purchase the good in the ﬁrst period. Integrating over all






















where the x’s represent the fulﬁlled expectations ﬁrms’ output. Note that the
surplus in the ﬁrst period depends also on the size of the network in the second
period.
Consider second period consumers; the surplus enjoyed by type r individual
when purchasing from ﬁrm i in the second period is simply given by:
CS
2
i (r) = r + V (ˆ yi) ¡ p
2






E i = I;E
where the last expression has been obtained using (9). In the second period,
only those consumers with r bigger than A¡xI ¡x2
I ¡x2
E purchase the good,
provided that those with r > A ¡ xI have already joined the network in the



















Similarly, we can compute the surpluses when entry is deterred/blockaded
















The FE equilibrium quantities sold in both periods are known. By sub-
stituting them into the above expressions, we compute the expressions of the
welfare function (19) for all the scenarios considered: full compatibility, full





A2 (808 ¡ 16µ3 + 192µ2 ¡ 696µ)
(¡25µ + 6µ2 + 22)2




A2 (808 + 34µ4 + 12µ5 + 1074µ2 ¡ 1424µ ¡ 236µ3)




A2 (808 ¡ 2µ5 + 932µ2 + 39µ4 ¡ 1416µ ¡ 280µ3)




A2 (808 + 1798µ2 ¡ 326µ3 + 4µ5 ¡ 2144µ + 31µ4)







1 + µ ¡ 3
2 µ2 + µ3¢
if µ 2 [0:315;0:394]
1
2
(11µ2 ¡ 66µ + 131)A2
(µ2 ¡ 9µ + 10)2 if µ 2 (0:394; ¯ µ]
where W d represents welfare when the incumbent deters entry or when entry
is blockaded19.
Although the algebra is a bit tedious, it is relatively easy to compare the
welfare levels in the diﬀerent scenarios; these comparisons yield the following
proposition20:
Proposition 5 (Socially optimal compatibility regimes). a) When en-
try cannot be deterred or blockaded (µ < µd), welfare is maximised with full
compatibility if µ < 0:27 and with a one-way compatible incumbent (Á = 1,
¹ = 0) for µ > 0:27; b) when µ ¸ µd, deterrence is never socially optimal and
welfare is maximised with full compatibility.
This result is interesting and it can be explained by analysing the conﬂicting
balance between ﬁrst and second period consumers surplus.
Consider the case with µ < µd; in this case entry always occurs in equilib-
rium whatever the compatibility choice made by the incumbent. First period
and second period consumers have diﬀerent and somehow diverging interests
regarding compatibility. Since ﬁrst period sales (i.e. the incumbent installed
base in the ﬁrst period) are greater if the rival is incompatible than otherwise,
ﬁrst period consumers prefer entry of an incompatible technology which allows
them to enjoy stronger network eﬀects in the ﬁrst period. On the other hand,
second period consumers strictly prefers full compatibility since it increases
the second period relevant network. If the strength of network externalities is
not too strong, then the eﬀect on second period consumers prevails and full
compatibility is socially optimal. If µ > 0:27, then the reverse is true and it is
socially optimal to have an incompatible entrant in the second period.
Things are much simpler if µ ¸ µd. In this case, the incumbent uses its
installed base to deter entry but this strategy is never socially optimal. Entry,
19Recall Proposition 1 for details of when this happens.
20The details of the proof are omitted as it is just a matter of comparing welfare levels
under the diﬀerent regimes as a function of µ.
25which is only possible via a compatible technology, is socially desirable and
welfare is maximised with full compatibility.
This result, which clearly holds if compatibility can be achieved at no cost,
conﬁrms the widespread idea that compatibility is good for consumers since it
makes the network larger and it increases individuals utility21. The novelty of
our framework which contemplates also intermediate forms of compatibility, is
that when network eﬀects are suﬃciently strong consumers may be better oﬀ
when only the incumbent is compatible with the entrant and not viceversa.
From Proposition 5, two others useful observations derive.
Corollary 2 (Market failure). Games 1 and 3 always induce ineﬃcient
compatibility choices. Game 2 yields the socially desirable outcome for µ < 0:27
and µ ¸ µd.
This corollary states the social ineﬃciency of the compatibility regimes that
result in equilibrium. The presence of market failures in markets characterised
by network externalities is a well known result since Katz and Shapiro (1985,
1986). A related interesting issue to address is whether this ineﬃciency can
be avoided in some way by a regulator or by an antitrust authority. The
social optimum can be obtained when network eﬀects are not too strong or,
when they are bigger then µd, by imposing compatibility between diﬀerent
technologies.
Consider the last game (the disclosure game); here the social welfare could
be maximised simply by mandating each ﬁrm to reveal to the rival the speci-
ﬁcations needed to build the adapter. But, clearly, this is not always possible:
the regulator would prefer to avoid such a direct intervention in the market
or simply she might not be allowed to implement such policy. The alternative
would be to impose a rule on ﬁrms’ conducts that we can deﬁne as reciprocity
rule: whenever a ﬁrm accepts the oﬀer made by the rival, it too has to oﬀer
its technical speciﬁcations.
This kind of rules in which, rather than intervening directly on ﬁrms’ strate-
gies, regulators tends to create a ”level playing ﬁeld” are quite popular among
policymakers, especially in IT sectors and network industries in general. In
our game, this is equivalent to say that if the incumbent oﬀers compatibility
(Á = 1), then, by accepting the oﬀer, the entrant is automatically required to
provide its technical speciﬁcations to the incumbent. It is possible to show the
following:
Corollary 3 (Neutrality of the ”Reciprocity Rule”). The equilibrium of
the game with information disclosure is not aﬀected by the imposition of the
”reciprocity rule”.
21See Katz and Shapiro (1985).
26In other words each ﬁrm’s commitment to reveal its information if the rival’s
oﬀer is accepted, something implied by the reciprocity rule, is not enough to
avoid ineﬃcient compatibility; to achieve social eﬃciency a direct intervention
is needed.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a simple model to study what we believe is an important
aspect of competition in network industries which can account for the observed
coexistence in a number of markets of diﬀerent and incompatible technologies.
Maintaining incompatibility with entrants is a strategic choice for an incum-
bent ﬁrm to protect its dominant position. With incompatibility, the installed
base of consumers serves the same preemptive purpose of irreversible invest-
ment. In our model compatibility can be achieved via a converter and we study
three diﬀerent scenarios (two-way converter, one-way converters, one-way con-
verters with property rights). Whenever an incumbent ﬁrm can prevent the
entrant to be compatible, as in our ﬁrst and third scenario, it will choose to do
so. In the resulting equilibria entry can be deterred for suﬃciently strong net-
work eﬀects. Conversely an incompatible entrant will always prefer to build an
adapter (both one and two-way) because this will allow it to enjoy the beneﬁts
of the incumbent’s installed base. These results further qualify those found
in previous literature that highlight the possibility of an incumbent inviting
entry of a compatible rival in order to increase network size. We show that
this never occurs in our model. We ﬁnally discuss the welfare properties of
the equilibria and we show that unless the regulatory authority intervenes to
mandate the appropriate compatibility regime, strategic forces tend to lead to
a socially ineﬃcient compatibility outcome.
27Appendix
Existence and uniqueness of second period FE Cournot equilibrium.















To prove that the second period cournot equilibrium with fulﬁlled expectations is
unique and stable, we proceed in two stages.
First let us show that Assumption 1 is a suﬃcient condition for both the fulﬁlled
expectations reactions curves to be negatively sloped and single valued. Imposing
FE, namely ˆ yI = x1
I + x2
I + ¹x2
E and ˆ yE = x2
E + Á(x1
I + x2
I), into (24) and (25), the















which are both negative for µ < 1. This is enough to verify that the reactions curves
are also single valued.
To guarantee existence and uniqueness of the second period equilibrium, we can
invoke Szidarowsky and Yakowitz (1977) and show that the reaction functions are
decreasing in the total industry output. From the reaction functions (24) and (25):
x2
I = A ¡ x1
I ¡ xtot + µ(ˆ yI) x2
E = A ¡ x1
I ¡ xtot + µ(ˆ yE)
where xtot = x2
I + x2
E. For any µ < 1, both these expressions deﬁne a continuous
function x2
i(xtot) which is decreasing in xtot. Therefore also the sum x2
I + x2
E is




i(xtot). The Brower’s ﬁxed point theorem guarantees the existence of the
equilibrium while the condition x2
i(xtot)0 < 0 is suﬃcient for establishing uniqueness.
Existence and uniqueness of ﬁrst period FE equilibrium. From ex-




I) where (15) can be thought of as a mapping of sales expectations into





I) is a linear function of ˆ x1
I, then to prove the existence, uniqueness and













¡3((¡1 + ¹Á)µ2 + (4 ¡ Á ¡ ¹)µ ¡ 3)µ
(Á2¹ ¡ Á + 2 ¡ 2¹Á)µ3 + (2¹ ¡ 9¹Á ¡ Á2 + 4 + 4Á)µ2 + (9Á ¡ 33 + 8¹)µ + 22
This expression provides the slope of the mapping x1
I = x1
I(ˆ x1
I) as a function of
µ, given the compatibility parameters Á = 0;1 and ¹ = 0;1. It is easy to verify
that condition (26) is met for µ < 1 for all the combinations of the compatibility
parameters except in the full incompatibility case (¹ = 0;Á = 0). In this case,
condition (26) is satisﬁed for µ < 0:704 which is the lower level of the upper bound
¯ µ.
Finally, by setting x1
I = ˆ x1
I, the ﬁrst period FEE is simply given by:
x1
I =
¡((5¹Á + 1 ¡ 2Á ¡ 4¹)µ2 + (¡4¹ ¡ Á + 9)µ ¡ 10)A
(¡Á + ¹Á ¡ 1 + Á2¹)µ3 + (¡Á2 + Á ¡ 9¹Á ¡ ¹ + 16)µ2 + (9Á ¡ 42 + 8¹)µ + 22
Proof. of Proposition 1 In order to establish when the incumbent deters entry,
we need to study under which conditions the optimal level of ﬁrst period output
x1
I is greater than xd













(¹ ¡ 1)µ2 + (3 ¡ ¹)µ ¡ 3
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µ2 ¡ 13µ + 4
¢¡
3 + µ2 + µ¹ ¡ 4µ
¢
¡22 ¡ 16µ2 + 42µ ¡ 8µ¹ + µ2¹ + µ3 (28)
We want to determine the sign of each of the two expressions. Let us start from
(27). The numerator is always positive; the sign of denominator is negative for
µ = 0, still negative for µ approaching 1 and since it is strictly convex in µ the sign
remains negative over the interval [0;1). Therefore the sign of (27) is negative. This
shows that with a compatible entrant (Á = 1) entry is never deterred in the FE
equilibrium.
Now consider (28); to determine the sign of this expression it is useful to consider
the two cases of ¹ = 1 and ¹ = 0 separately. With ¹ = 1 (28) becomes:
A
¡
µ2 ¡ 13µ + 4
¢¡
3 + µ2 ¡ 3µ
¢
¡22 ¡ 15µ2 + 34µ + µ3 (29)
The denominator is negative both for µ = 0 and µ = 1 and the ﬁrst derivative is
strictly positive in µ thus implying that the denominator is always negative. The
numerator is positive for µ = 0 and negative for µ = 1, the second derivative is
always positive in µ 2 [0;1). This is suﬃcient to prove that there is only one value
29of µ such that the numerator is zero. This happens for µ = 0:315 ´ µd. Therefore
the sign of (28) when ¹ = 1 is negative for µ < µd and positive thereafter.
With ¹ = 0 (28) becomes:
A
¡
µ2 ¡ 13µ + 4
¢¡
3 + µ2 ¡ 3µ
¢
¡22 ¡ 16µ2 + 42µ + µ3 (30)
The numerator is the same as in the previous case. As for the denominator, it is
easy to check that it is always negative in the relevant range of µ. Therefore the
result is the same as before. We can ﬁnally conclude that ∆jÁ=0 ¸ 0 only if µ ¸ µd,
which ends the proof of the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
To prove the second part we need to show that the output the incumbent will
produce acting as a pure monopoly x1
mon in the ﬁrst period is not suﬃcient to deter
entry for µ < 0:394. To do this we compute the optimal production plan for the two
periods under the assumption that the incumbent is the only active ﬁrm. Second
period monopoly output contingent on x1
I is the same as in the duopoly case22, the








I it is straightforward to verify that x1
mon ¸ xd
I () µ ¸ 0:394.
Proof. of Proposition 2 Suppose µ < µd: from the previous section, we know
that entry occurs. From the expressions ¼I
c;c and ¼I
i;i it can be veriﬁed that for any
value of µ, ¼I
i;i > ¼I
c;c: the incumbent always gain from incompatibility. Therefore
at t = 1, the incumbent chooses incompatibility.
Suppose now that µ ¸ µd. In this case we need to compare ¼I
c;c with ¼d given in
expression (18). Since ¼d > ¼I
c;c then ¹ = 0, which induces entry deterrence, is again
the optimal incumbent’s strategy.
Proof. of Proposition 3 In the second stage of the game the entrant decides
whether to build the converter. Observing the payoﬀ functions it is immediate to
verify that irrespective of the choice of the incumbent in the ﬁrst period, Á = 1 is






Naturally, this holds also for µ ¸ µd since in this case entry of an incompatible rival
cannot occur and ¼E
c;i = ¼E
i;i = 0.
Moving backward, since ¼I
c;c > ¼I
i;c then also for the incumbent is optimal to be
compatible with the entrant.






30Proof. of Proposition 4 We determine the equilibrium by backward induction.
Consider ﬁrst the case with µ < µd; in this situation, entry cannot be prevented
by the incumbent who, conditional on information being disclosed by the entrant
(¹ = 1), at the last stage of the game, has to decide whether to accept the oﬀer
or not. There are three nodes where the incumbent is asked to decide; these are
reached along the following paths:
1. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant accepts and oﬀers
¹ = 1;
2. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant rejects and oﬀers
¹ = 1;
3. Incumbent refuses information disclosure, Á = 0, Entrant oﬀers ¹ = 1.
In Figure 6, we can see that if the incumbent is asked to accept/reject ¹ = 1, then








The entrant has to decide whether to disclose its information knowing that if infor-
mation is disclosed, the incumbent will use it in order to build the converter. The
entrant has to take such decision at three diﬀerent nodes reached along the following
paths:
1. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant accepts;
2. Incumbent oﬀers its technical speciﬁcations, Á = 1, Entrant rejects;
3. Incumbent denies information disclosure, Á = 0.
It is simple to check that for the entrant is optimal to deny its technical speciﬁcations








Moving backwards, the entrant has now to accept/reject Á = 1 conditional on the
oﬀer being made by the incumbent. The entrant accepts the oﬀer since ¼E
i;i < ¼E
i;c.
Finally, anticipating these sequences of decisions, the incumbent at the initial node
decides not to reveal its information given that ¼I
i;i > ¼I
i;c. This shows that the
only subgame perfect FE equilibrium when µ < µd is the full incompatibility regime
where both ﬁrms do not disclose their speciﬁcations.
If µ ¸ µd, we know from Proposition 1 that entry of an incompatible rival is de-
terred; choosing not to reveal its speciﬁcations, the monopolist prevents entry. This
simpliﬁes the game tree; if Á is set to zero at the initial node, the game ends with
the incumbent enjoying proﬁts ¼d. If the incumbent chooses Á = 1 and the entrant
rejects, the game ends with entry deterrence and the same proﬁts for the incumbent.
If the incumbent chooses Á = 1 and the entrant accepts, the remaining nodes and




31Proof of Corollary 3. Let us start with µ < ¯ µ. From the previous analysis,
we know that at the last stage of the game the incumbent always accepts the oﬀer








Suppose that the incumbent oﬀers Á =1. Given the reciprocity rule, if the entrant
accepts, it must also oﬀer its information to the incumbent which will accepts the
oﬀer. The entrant ends up with ¼E
c;c. On the other hand, if the incumbent’s oﬀer
is rejected, the entrant is free to deny its technical speciﬁcations; in this case, if it
oﬀers ¹ = 1, the incumbent will accept and entrant’s payoﬀ is ¼E
c;i, while if it does
not oﬀer compatibility, the ﬁnal outcome of the game is full incompatibility and





the entrant prefers not to disclose its technical speciﬁcations to the incumbent, given
that it did not accept incumbent’s oﬀer. Summing up, under reciprocity, if Á = 1
has been oﬀered by the incumbent, then the entrant obtains ¼E
c;c if it accepts the
oﬀer and ¼E
i;i otherwise; since ¼E
c;c > ¼E
i;i, then the entrant always accepts the oﬀer.
Going backward, let’s consider incumbent’s choice. If it does not reveal its technical
information, reciprocity does not apply and the entrant can either oﬀer ¹ = 1 or
¹ = 0; in the ﬁrst case, since the incumbent accepts the oﬀer, entrant’s payoﬀ is ¼E
c;i
and ¼E
i;i otherwise. Again, since ¼E
c;i < ¼E
i;i the entrant will never launch the oﬀer.
Therefore the incumbent decides Á = 0 or Á = 1 by anticipating that, if the oﬀer
is launched then full compatibility is the equilibrium and if it denies its technical
speciﬁcations then the game ends with full incompatibility. Since ¼I
c;c < ¼I
i;i, the
incumbent will never disclose its information: Á = 0 and ¹ = 0 is the compatibility
equilibrium.
Suppose now that µ > ¯ µ. In this case when the incumbent does not disclose its
information (Á = 0), preemption occurs and the ﬁrm obtains ¼d. If, on the contrary,
information is disclosed, then entry occurs and the entrant accepts and builds the
adapter. For the reciprocity, the entrant must make the same oﬀer to the incumbent
who accepts: full compatibility is the outcome in this case.
Consider the incumbent’s problem: since ¼d > ¼I
c;c then it will never disclose its
speciﬁcations.
This shows that the equilibrium of the game is unaﬀected by the imposition of the
reciprocity rule.
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